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Eli Lilly and the International
Investment Law Challenge to a
Neo-Federal IP Regime
Jason Yackee* & Shubha Ghosh"
ABSTRACT
This Article examines the implications of the Eli Lilly case-and
international investment law (IIL) more generally-for the operation of
an international intellectual property (IP) regime that functions along
the lines of the "neo-federalist" model developed by Professors Dinwoodie
and Dreyfuss. The neo-federalist model involves a world in which the
international IP regime grants national political communities
substantial discretion to pursue their own visions of the normatively
proper balance between the rights of IP creators and of those who seek to
use it. Importantly, that discretion involves the ability to alter the
existing normative balance in either the direction of more or fewer rights
for IP creators. Under this view, the international IP regime is not, and
should not be construed, either as a universal and comprehensive IP
"code," nor as a one-way ratchet that only permits member-state
experimentation i  favor of IP creators. Yet, that sort of systemic rigidity
is precisely what the claimant in Eli Lilly sought to impose through the
IIL regime. While it is true that the claimant, Eli Lilly, lost its case, a
close reading of the award, along with an appreciation of the dynamics
of HL, suggests that substantial danger remains. Using Eli Lilly as a
case study, this Article explores the challenges that the IL system poses
for the realization of the neo-federalist vision.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this Article, the Authors explore the implications of the Eli
Lilly case for the operation of an international intellectual property (IP)
regime that functions along the lines of the "neo-federalist" model
developed by Professors Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss in a series of articles1
and their book.2 Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss imagine a world in which the
international IP regime grants national political communities
substantial discretion to pursue their own visions of the normatively
proper balance between the rights of creators of IP and of those who
seek to use it.3 Importantly, that discretion involves the ability to
change the particular normative balance of the day in either the
direction of more or fewer rights for IP creators. For Dinwoodie and
Dreyfuss, the international IP regime is not, and should not be
construed, either as a universal and comprehensive IP "code," or as a
one-way ratchet that permits member-state experimentation.4 Yet,
that sort of systemic rigidity is precisely what the claimant in Eli Lilly
sought to impose-not through the international IP regime, but through
the parallel and partially overlapping regime of international
investment law (IIL), a regime that was created to solve a much
different set of problems than the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and similar IP-focused
1. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 95, 95-96 (2004) [hereinafter
Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss I]; Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, International
Intellectual Property Law and the Public Domain of Science, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 431, 432,
447-48 (2004) [hereinafter Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss II]; Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C.
Dreyfuss, Designing a Global Intellectual Property System Responsive to Change: The WTO,
WIPO, and Beyond, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1187, 1197 (2009) [hereinafter Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss
III].
2. See GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE C. DREYFUss, A NEOFEDERALIST VISION
OF TRIPS: THE RESILIENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 5,
202-03 (2012).
3. See id. at 202-03.
4. See id. at 5; Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss I, supra note 1, at 106; Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss
III, supra note 1, at 1224.
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treaties.5 While it is true that the claimant, Eli Lilly, lost its case,6 a
close reading of the award, along with an appreciation of the dynamics
of IIL, suggests that substantial danger remains. As this Article
argues, Eli Lilly illustrates the challenge that the IIL system poses for
the realization of the neo-federalist vision.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I introduces the neo-
federalist framework. Part II provides a brief overview of the IIL
system. Part III summarizes Eli Lilly's core claims in its arbitration
with Canada, as relevant to the ability of states to enjoy substantial IP
policy autonomy. Part IV considers whether a private right of action to
litigate IP claims under IlL is justified under standard rationales for
the IIL system. Part V concludes.
II. THE NEO-FEDERALIST VISION
The neo-federalist model seeks to push back on a vision of TRIPS
that views the treaty as imposing strict and inflexible limits on IP-
related state sovereignty. As Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss describe the
vision that they challenge, it is the view that TRIPS is a "supranational
code[ ] instructing countries on what they must do and when and how
they must do it."7 They seek to replace that view with what they call a
"neo-federalist" understanding of TRIPS.8 Federalism can be viewed as
an "essentially contested concept," devoid of any universally accepted
meaning.9 Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss, however, do not cite or otherwise
engage with the extensive literatures in law or in political science
debating the best understanding of what federalism means or why it
might be a good thing. Their model nonetheless seems to reflect, more
5. See infra Part II.
6. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov't of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Final Award, ¶
480 (Mar. 16, 2017) [hereinafter Eli Lilly, Final Award], https://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/italaw8546.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8ZL-8886].
7. DINWOODIE & DREYFUSS, supra note 2, at 5 (emphasis in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
8. See id.
9. See Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 1997-98
(2014) ("Modern state-federal relationships have given rise to many new and difficult legal
questions-ranging from those of state-versus-federal-court jurisdiction to matters of
administrative deference, statutory enforcement, and standards of review. Such questions
have split the lower courts, have yet to be resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court, and are
affecting how major federal laws are being carried out across the country. Half the time, the
courts do not even recognize these questions as federalism questions, even though they
unquestionably concern the discretion, influence, and sovereignty of states in a national legal
landscape."); Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in
Florida)?, 21 L. & PHIL. 137, 148 n.29 (2002) (defining the "essentially contestable concept"
through an analysis of the Rule of Law) (citing W.B. Galliem, Essentially Contested Concepts,
56 PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y 167, 167 (1955)).
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or less, a "dual federalism" or "separate spheres" variant.10 In dual
federalism, the two levels of government-national and subnational-
enjoy plenary authority (e.g., sovereignty) over distinct issue areas."
By referring to their model of TRIPS as "neo-federalist," Dinwoodie and
Dreyfuss seem to suggest hat TRIPS should be understood and applied
as reflecting a similar kind of duality, albeit in a "neo" (or new) way.
Applied to the IP regime, one can understand the international
community, coming together periodically in the forum of international
trade negotiations, to retain sovereignty to decide certain rules and
standards governing national-level treatment of IP rights. The core of
TRIPS is a more or less hard rule that imposes antidiscrimination as a
global norm.12 Member states can deviate from the TRIPS regime only
by invoking a handful of arguably narrow excuses or exceptions.13 The
international community has thus assumed "sovereignty" over the issue
of IP-related discrimination, having decided that such discrimination is
undesirable as a policy matter and should no longer be tolerated as an
international legal matter. TRIPS also provides a number of other hard
rules that effectively preclude contrary member-state action. These
rules are typically set up as minimums (or floors) that member-state
policies cannot fall below. For example, TRIPS requires that trademark
registrations shall be granted for periods of at least seven years;14
copyrights for phonograms must run at least fifty years.15
But outside of these and a few other issues, in which the
international community-through TRIPS or its equivalents-has said
"this and nothing else," member states have retained authority to go
their own way based on their own understandings of the goals that IP
policy should aim to achieve and of how IP policy should be designed
10. On dual federalism, see Ernest A. Young, The Puzzling Persistence of Dual
Federalism, in 55 NOMOS LV: FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY 34, 36-37 (James E. Fleming
& Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014). The main competitor to dual federalism is the model of
"cooperative federalism," in which the two units of government assist each other in
implementing policies. Id. at 44; see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken,
Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L. J. 1256, 1261-62 (2009).
11. See Young, supra note 10, at 37.
12. See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2821, 2839-40 (2006) ('TRIPS binds its signatories to the principle of
national treatment such that a country cannot reat a foreign intellectual property rights
holder any worse than it would treat its own nationals. National treatment substitutes a rule
of non-discrimination for the principle of reciprocity." (footnote omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
13. See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
art. 14.5, 18, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
14. See id. art. 18.
15. See id. art. 14.5.
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and implemented to achieve those goals.16 Under a neo-federalist view,
allowing member states to retain such authority is especially important
given that rapid technological changes predictably give rise to
normative dilemmas that the preexisting international IP regime has
not authoritatively settled and that-because of the lack of a
functioning, legitimate world legislature-it cannot readily settle.7
Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss provide as an example the problem of gene
patenting-an issue that simply did not exist until quite recently, and
for which "there is no obviously correct approach for dealing with the
negative side of exclusivity."1 8 Given that the international community
has not reached a consensus on the appropriate resolution of such
issues (and because the international community is unable to easily
adjust such consensus to changing circumstances), member states
should be free to come to their own solutions, even if the lack of
international uniformity risks distorting incentives to produce a
globally optimal amount of IP.
It is important to recognize that Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss are not
suggesting a model of the international IP regime that is, in Rubin and
Feeley's terms, merely "managerial." In a managerial model, the
authority to decide all or virtually all policy goals is located at the
higher political level, which delegates implementation downward based
on the theory that local implementation will be more effective at
achieving the centrally set goals than would top-down
implementation.19 Thus, their justification for the neo-federalist model
is not that it allows member states to experiment with ways to best
achieve a policy goal set by TRIPS, identifying along the way best
practices for setting up national IP rules and institutions compliant
with global rules. Instead, they suggest that their model provides
necessary flexibility for member states to design domestic IP regimes-
within noncomprehensive international constraints-that reflect the
member states' own "political, institutional, economic, and social
conditions" as those conditions vary and change over time.20
16. See Molly K. Land, Rebalancing TRIPS, 33 MICH. J. INT'L L. 433, 438-45 (2012)
(describing TRIPS flexibilities).
17. See DINWOODIE & DREYFUSS, supra note 2, at 5; Land, supra note 16, at 436-38
(providing various policy justifications for interpreting TRIPS as allowing states to adjust
their implementation of TRIPS to suit local conditions).
18. See DINWOODIE & DREYFUSS, supra note 2, at 19.
19. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 911 (1994).
20. See Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss I, supra note 1, at 96-97.
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III. THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW SYSTEM
To understand how one might apply the neo-federalist model to
the Eli Lilly case, it is necessary to have a basic understanding of the
IIL system's history and functioning. IIL, in its modern form, emerged
relatively soon after the end of World War II, as it became widely
appreciated that should newly independent countries wish to develop
economically, they would certainly need access to international
capital.21 While some of that capital could be provided through the
Bretton Woods institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank, large amounts of private capital would be
necessary as well.2 2 Certain kinds of risks-which one might refer to in
shorthand as "political risks"23-were seen as a major impediment to
private investment. In particular, potential investors were seen as
being especially sensitive to the possibility of opportunistic behavior by
host state governments. One example of "opportunistic behavior"
involves the dilemma of the obsolescing bargain, under which the host
state has an increasing incentive to expropriate a foreign investment in
an industry characterized by high fixed costs, such as mining, once the
investment has been sunk and is now capable of generating income.24
Spectacular natural-resource nationalizations in the 1960s and 1970s
in Kuwait,25 Libya,26 Chile,27 and elsewhere-arguably evidencing
obsolescing-bargain dynamics-lent a particular sense of urgency to
find a solution.
In response, the international community created an
increasingly dense network of bilateral investment treaties (BITs).28
21. See A. A. FATOUROS, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS 12, 19,
29 (1962). On that early history, see TAYLOR ST. JOHN, THE RISE OF INVESTOR-STATE
ARBITRATION: POLITICS, LAW, AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 1, 68 (2018).
22. See FATOUROS, supra note 21, at 12, 19-20 (describing developing countries' need
for foreign capital in the context of the development of international investment law).
23. For a critique of the concept of political risk as it relates to IIL, see Jason Webb
Yackee, Political Risk and International Investment Law, 24 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 477,
479-81, 493-94 (2014).
24. See Erik J. Woodhouse, The Obsolescing Bargain Redux? Foreign Investment in
the Electric Power Sector in Developing Countries, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 121, 127-28,
130 (2005) (describing the obsolescing bargain dilemma).
25. See F. A. Mann, The Aminoil Arbitration, 54 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 213, 213 (1984).
26. See Evrett W. Benton, Comment, The Libyan Expropriations: Further
Developments on the Remedy ofInvalidation of Title, 11 HOUS. L. REV. 924, 937-38 (1974).
27. See THEODORE MORAN, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE POLITICS OF
DEPENDENCE: COPPER IN CHILE 4-5 (1974).
28. See Abbey Stemler, Scott Shackelford & Eric Richards, Paris, Panels, and
Protectionism: Matching US Rhetoric with Reality to Save the Planet, 19 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 545, 550 (2017). Scholarship on the subject is too vast to comprehensively cite here,
[Vol. 21:2:517522
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There are now thousands of BITs in force,29 and they follow a largely
common model of providing foreign investors with substantive rights-
often including the right to adequate compensation in the event of
expropriation, along with the procedural right of a private right of
access to international arbitration for alleged treaty violations. 30 This
procedural aspect is the real innovation. Until BITs, it was exceedingly
rare for private actors to have any right or ability to directly access the
machinery of international adjudication.31 Prior to this development,
private actors had to convince their home state governments to
"espouse" their claims on the international stage or rely on an
arbitration clause in a concession contract.32 Now that many investors
have that procedural right, they tend to see violations of their
substantive treaty rights as arising from government policy actions that
are far removed from the sorts of opportunistic expropriations that
motivate justifications for the IIL system but which, in reality, are
exceedingly rare.33 The result has been an explosion in IIL-related
litigation,34 including claims-like Eli Lilly-that changes in domestic
IP law violate IIL.
IIL and BITs are designed to cover investments, not property.
IIL, therefore, protects IP only if IP rights are considered investments
themselves. In fact, they are considered investments, thanks to
expansive treaty-based definitions of "investment" that often contain,
as part of an open-ended illustrative list, an explicit mention of IP as
one kind of "investment" that the particular treaty is meant to protect.35
but for a recent empirical overview, see Daniel Behn, Legitimacy, Evolution, and Growth in
Investment Treaty Arbitration: Empirically Evaluating the State-of-the-Art, 46 GEO. J. INT'L
L. 363, 364, 368, 370, 412-13 (2015).
29. See International Investment Agreement Navigator, INV. POL'Y HUB,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA [https://perma.cc/XSM8-668C] (last visited Oct.
13, 2018).
30. See Yackee, supra note 23, at 491; Jason Webb Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in
the Empirical Study of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 405, 416 (2008)
(describing the substantive core of most BITs).
31. See Maximilian Koessler, Government Espousal of Private Claims Before
International Tribunals, 13 U. CHI. L. REV. 180, 180-81 (1946).
32. On this earlier regime of espousal, see id.
33. See Yackee, supra note 23, at 487, 491-92.
34. See Behn, supra note 28, at 365.
35. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, 2012 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY art. 1 (2012) [hereinafter
2012 U.S. MODEL BIT]. Many investment treaties, especially those of more recent vintage,
specifically define covered "investments" through very broad and open-ended lists of
examples that explicitly include intellectual property rights, a concept which may be further
defined into component categories such as "patents" and so on. See id. For example, the 2012
Model US BIT defines "investment" as "every asset hat an investor owns or controls, directly
or indirectly," and provides a long list of "forms" that such an investment might take,
2018] 523
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IIL thus sidesteps the longstanding debate in IP circles about whether
IP should be conceptualized and legally treated the same as "property"
more generally.36 In IIL, the relevant question is whether IP should be
treated differently than investments. So far, the answer seems to be
that IP rights are just like any other kind of investment.37
Current US treaty practice admittedly provides a partial
exception.38 The 2012 Model US BIT expressly excludes certain TRIPS-
compliant policy actions from the scope of the treaty's expropriation
including "intellectual property rights" (IPR). Id. Earlier US BITs provide even more detailed
specifications of what counts as a covered IPR. See Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Republic of Moldova Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment, Mold.-U.S., art. 1(1)(a)(iv), Apr. 21, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. No. 103-
14 (1993). For example, article 1 of the 1994 US-Moldova BIT covers "investments" including
"intellectual property which includes, inter alia, rights relating to: literary and artistic
works, including sound recordings, inventions in all fields of human endeavor, industrial
designs, semiconductor mask works, trade secrets, know-how, and confidential business
information, and trademarks, service marks, and trade names." Id. While some BITs do not
provide a treaty-based definition of "investment," arbitral tribunals interpreting the concept
tend to adopt very broad conceptions. See KRISTA NADAKAVUKAREN SCHEFER,
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 60 (2013) ("When in doubt,
tribunals are often generous in setting the boundaries of what is included within the scope
of the term [investment].").
36. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property As Property: Delineating
Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1744 (2007) ("At the core of controversies
over the correct scope of intellectual property lie grave doubts about whether intellectual
property is property. Property covers a broad range of resources, from solid objects like land
and cars to fugitive resources like water to intangibles like debts. But, as a resource,
information is different from all of these.").
37. On the debate concerning whether IP rights are "investments" under IIL, see
Ruth L. Okediji, Is Intellectual Property "Investment'? Eli Lilly v. Canada and the
International Intellectual Property System, 35 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1121, 1125 (2014).
38. See 2012 U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 35, art. 6(5). However, not all US BITs
contain IP-related exceptions. See, e.g., Treaty Between the United States of America and
Ukraine Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Ukr.-U.S.,
art. III(1), Mar. 4, 1994, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-37 (1996); Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement
and Protection of Investment, Arg.-U.S., art. IV(1), Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY DOc. NO. 103-
2 (1993); Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Poland
Concerning Business and Economic Relations, Pol.-U.S., art. VII(1), Mar. 21, 1990, S.
TREATY DOC. No. 101-18 (1990) [hereinafter U.S.-Poland BIT]. Moreover, the Authors'
impression is that most non-US BITs do not contain limited IP carve-outs along the lines of
the US model. That is, in most BITs (including many early US BITs), IP-related
expropriation claims are treated the same as non-IP expropriation claims, and compliance
with TRIPS or other international IP instruments will not serve as an automatic excuse from
liability. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of
the Republic of Armenia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Arm.-Can., art.
VII(1), May 8, 1997, 2468 U.N.T.S. 381; Agreement Between the Government of Australia
and the Government of the Republic of Chile on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Austl.-Chile, art. 6(1), July 9, 1996, 2116 U.N.T.S. 379; U.S.-Poland BIT, supra
note 38, art. VII(1).
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article.39 Specifically, investors may not raise expropriation claims to
challenge the granting of compulsory licenses "in accordance with"
TRIPS; nor may they challenge-as an expropriation-"the revocation,
limitation, or creation of intellectual property rights, to the extent that
such issuance, revocation, limitation, or creation is consistent with the
TRIPS Agreement."40 NAFTA chapter 11, which served as the basis for
Eli Lilly's claim against Canada,41 contains similar language limiting
the availability of IP-related expropriation claims to actions that violate
NAFTA's IP chapter.42
However, the Model Treaty does not preclude challenges to IP
policies under other substantive treaty provisions, such as the treaty's
fair and equitable treatment clause (FET);43 nor does it preclude
expropriation challenges to non-TRIPS-compliant IP revocations,
limitations, or creations.44 NAFTA's investment chapter contains a
similar qualification.4 5 And indeed, in its NAFTA case, Eli Lilly
proffered both an expropriation claim, alleging that the Canadian court
decision was both an expropriation and a violation of NAFTA's IP
chapter, and an FET claim.46
A key implication of the neo-federalist model-and one at the
core of the Eli Lilly case-is that member states enjoy, or should be
viewed as enjoying, significant latitude to adjust their IP-related
policies to provide IP creators with either more or less generous rights,
so long as those adjustments respect the antidiscrimination norm and
other hard rules embedded in TRIPS.47 For Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss,
this policy flexibility necessarily includes the right to adjust IP law to
provide either more protection to IP creators, or less.4 8 The IIL system
interferes with the neo-federalist model precisely because it provides IP
rights holders, understood as "investors," with a legal vocabulary and a
39. See 2012 U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 35, art. 6(5).
40. Id.
41. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov't of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Notice of Intent
to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven, at 1 (Nov. 7, 2012)
[hereinafter Eli Lilly, Notice of Intent], https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw1172.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8R6-PWSA]; North American Free Trade
Agreement ch. 11, art. 1110, ¶ (7), Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M.
289 [hereinafter NAFTA].
42. See NAFTA, supra note 41, ch. 17, arts. 1701-02.
43. See 2012 U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 35, art. 6(5); infra Section IV.B.
44. See 2012 U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 35, art. 6(5); infra Section IV.A.
45. See NAFTA, supra note 41, ch. 11, art. 1110(7)-(8).
46. See infra Part IV.
47. See Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss I, supra note 1, at 97-102; Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss II,
supra note 1, at 432, 434.
48. See Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss I, supra note 1, at 97.
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legal procedure through which to challenge diminutions of their
existing rights. That vocabulary may, but need not, include
"expropriation." In fact, Eli Lilly's most potent argument was not that
the invalidation of their patents was expropriatory, but rather that it
violated the company's "legitimate investment-backed expectations" of
a stable IP legal regime, and that, as such, they were denied their right
to fair and equitable treatment under NAFTA article 1105.49
IV. THE ELI LILLY CASE
NAFTA chapter 11 provided Eli Lilly with the substantive and
procedural law necessary to bring its international claim.50 Investors
who bring such claims are typically challenging the international
legality of actions undertaken by the executive, administrative, or
legislative officers of the host state.5 1 The Eli Lilly case is unusual, and
all the more interesting, because the company challenged the actions of
Canadian courts. While such challenges are not unprecedented,52 they
are relatively rare; moreover, they raise certain sensitivities in relation
to the proper role of international courts in reviewing decisions by other
judicial institutions.53 These challenges also question the propriety of
the internal domestic separation of powers principles.54
49. See infra Section IV.C.
50. See NAFTA, supra note 41, ch. 11, art. 1102, 1105, 1110; Eli Lilly, Notice of
Intent, supra note 41, at 1.
51. See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 330
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2004) (1994) (noting that international investment law tribunals
show "extreme reluctance . . . to find that judicial organs of states [have] acted improperly").
52. See, e.g., Loewen v. United States, No. Civ.A. 04-2151 (RWR), 2005 WL 3200885,
at *1-2 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2005). Indeed, perhaps the most notorious NAFTA chapter 11 case
to date involved an investor's attack on a US state court judge's behavior during trial. See
Lucien J. Dhooge, The Loewen Group v. United States: Punitive Damages and the Foreign
Investment Provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 495,
497 (2004); William S. Dodge, Loewen v. United States: Trials and Errors Under NAFTA
Chapter Eleven, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 563, 565-66 (2002).
53. See Dodge, supra note 52, at 570-72.
54. Cf. Eli Lilly, Notice of Intent, supra note 41, ¶¶ 37-43. For example, it is unclear
how the Canadian government should respond to the threat of IIL lawsuits challenging
ongoing litigation in Canadian courts. See Martha A. Field, The Differing Federalisms of
Canada nd the United States, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 118 (1992); Separation of
Powers in Canada, CONST. L. CAN., http://www.constitutional-
law.net/index.php?option=com-content&view=article&id=24&Itemid=38
[https://perma.cc/R2V7-BHSS] (last visited Oct. 15, 2018) ("[I]t has become common in
[Canadian] constitutional doctrine to conceive that the institutions of government have
proper roles to play in Canadian democracy. In carrying out their functions, each branch
should have proper regard and 'mutual respect' for the role of the other branches.").
Separation of powers principles may limit the ability or acceptability of political intervention
in ongoing litigation. See id.
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Eli Lilly's complaint, at the most basic level, was that Canadian
courts wrongfully refused to enforce certain drug patents that generic
competitors challenged as invalid.55 Interestingly, Eli Lilly pitched its
claim as a larger attack on Canada's common-law tradition. That
tradition, unlike its civil law counterpart, recognizes as legitimate the
notion that courts evolve the law to reflect local conditions and to
respond to changed social and political environments.56 The challenged
adaptation here was the "promise utility doctrine," under which
Canadian federal courts would assess a patent's "utility"-utility being
a necessary condition of patent validity-against the promised utility
disclosed in the patent specification.5 7
Eli Lilly cared about the promise utility doctrine because the
doctrine itself promised to impose a certain amount of rigor into patent-
utility analysis. As Eli Lilly emphasized repeatedly in its memorial, the
essential problem with the promise utility doctrine was that the
doctrine had teeth.58 Eli Lilly preferred what it characterized as a
"mere scintilla" standard, under which even the barest whiff of utility
would be enough to sustain a patent.59 In Eli Lilly's world of patent
law, virtually no pharmaceutical patent would be denied or revoked
because of a lack of utility. In contrast, in the world of Canada's promise
utility doctrine, pharmaceutical patents sometimes were.60 According
to Eli Lilly, two NAFTA chapter 11 articles prevented Canadian courts
from developing their promise utility doctrine: article 1110, governing
expropriaton, and article 1105, providing Eli Lilly with the right to "fair
and equitable treatment."61 Both arguments sought to lock in Eli Lilly's
55. See Eli Lilly, Notice of Intent, supra note 41, ¶T 102-03. For a summary of the
domestic court claims and proceedings, see Freedom-Kai Phillips, Promise Utility Doctrine
and Compatibility under NAFTA: Expropriation and Chapter 11 Considerations, 40 CAN.-
U.S. L.J. 84, 86-93 (2016).
56. See Allan C. Hutchinson, Work-in-Progress: Evolution and Common Law, 11 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 253, 261 (2005).
57. Phillips, supra note 55, at 93-95 (describing the promise utility doctrine).
58. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov't of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Claimant's
Memorial, ¶ 57 (Sept. 29, 2014) [hereinafter Eli Lilly, Claimant's Memorial],
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4046.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Q392-K7A9] (arguing that "the promise utility doctrine has created additional hurdles to
patentability" beyond the minimal hurdles under Lilly's preferred "mere scintilla" standard
of utility).
59. Id. ¶ 197 ("[The test requires only a] slight amount of utility .... As long as an
invention was neither inoperable nor purely abstract, it typically passed Canada's objective
test" for utility." (internal quotations omitted)).
60. See id. ¶¶ 221-22 (describing instances of Canadian courts declaring
pharmaceutical patents to fail the promise utility test).
61. See id. ¶¶ 167-291 (making the expropriation argument in ¶¶ 167-250 and
making the FET argument in TT 251-91).
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right to enjoy a utility doctrine resistant to legal development and
change.
A. The Expropriation Claim
NAFTA article 1110 establishes, as a matter of international
law, that the NAFTA parties may not "expropriate" foreign investments
without paying prompt and adequate compensation.62  But
expropriatory actions that are compliant with NAFTA's IP chapter-
chapter 17-are excluded from the scope of article 1110.63 Eli Lilly's
expropriation argument, therefore, necessarily had to include the claim
that the Canadian court's development of the promise utility doctrine
violated chapter 17. However, while chapter 17 does require the
NAFTA parties to grant patents for "useful" inventions, the chapter
nowhere defines what that broad standard should entail in practice.64
The natural implication would seem to indicate that the NAFTA
drafters intended-by their failure to define a more precise rule-to
allow the parties to go their own way, perhaps within certain generous
bounds.
Eli Lilly argued that because all of the NAFTA parties
recognized the "mere scintilla" test in their national laws at the time of
NAFTA's signature, and because they continued to do so for some years
later, the parties intended to freeze that common national practice into
place as an international standard implicitly embodied within chapter
17.65 That basic argument was combined in an unruly fashion with a
handful of others, including argument by dictionary and the puzzling
claim that the Patent Cooperation Treaty-which explicitly states in
article 27(5) that "[n]othing in this Treaty and the Regulations is
intended to be construed as prescribing anything that would limit the
freedom of each Contracting State to prescribe such substantive
conditions of patentability as it desires"-nonetheless upported the
claim that the "mere scintilla" test was the only one that Canada could
adopt.66
The Tribunal barely gave the company's expropriation argument
the time of day. Its analysis of the issue spans just nine relatively
unenlightening paragraphs.6 7 The Tribunal absolved itself of any
62. NAFTA, supra note 41, ch. 11, art. 1110.
63. See id.
64. See id. ch. 17, art. 1709.
65. Eli Lilly, Claimant's Memorial, supra note 58, TT 8, 145-60.
66. See id. T 280; Patent Cooperation Treaty art. 27(5), June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T.
7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231.
67. See Eli Lilly, Final Award, supra note 6, T 218-26.
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further obligation to wrestle with the claim on the ground that
regardless of what IIL has to say about IP expropriations, Eli Lilly
failed to prove that Canada's common law utility test represented a
radical departure from past practice.68 This Article discusses that
factual contention in more detail below, in the context of Eli Lilly's FET
claim.
Eli Lilly's expropriation claim nonetheless usefully illustrates
some of the problems with using IIL to pursue international IP claims.
IIL does not operate as a closed set of legal rules. Rather, its broad
standards of treatment allow claimants to easily import into IIL's
dispute-settlement procedures various substantive legal rules that
reside in other international instruments and regimes. The porosity of
the IIL regime thus allows investors to use IIL to challenge state
compliance with other international legal regimes even where the
challenged regime itself does not give nongovernmental actors a private
right of action. The private right of action-while perhaps sensible in
cases involving breaches of foreign investment contracts and other
discrete public-private commercial relationships-has long been
deemed by states as disruptive or even dangerous to the operation of
other international regimes.69 The disruption arises, in part, from the
fact that private actors, with their own narrow interests and agendas,
are able to avoid the political and diplomatic filter that state-to-state
dispute settlement provides.70 A further problem is that IIL's remedial
scheme-money damages-may be wholly different from, if not
68. See id. T 308. Despite the Tribunal's cursory treatment of it, the company's
expropriation argument raised a sensitive and difficult international legal question that
would have, had the Tribunal ruled on the merits for the company, made the award highly
controversial. That question is the extent to which decisions of domestic courts should be
reviewable by IIL tribunals on the same grounds as the actions of other governmental actors,
or whether court decisions could only be reviewed under a narrow standard of "denial of
justice." See id. ¶¶ 174-88. The issue-and its sensitivity-has domestic parallels. For
example, it remains hotly contested in US jurisprudence whether judicial decisions should
be treated just like administrative or legislative acts for the purposes of the US
Constitution's Takings Clause. See Laura S. Underkuffler, Judicial Takings: A Medley of
Misconceptions, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 203, 203 (2011). As the Tribunal seems to have
recognized, Eli Lilly's position-that domestic court decisions are just as reviewable for
expropriation-clause violations as any other government action-risked pushing the
Tribunal into treacherous waters. As the Tribunal made sure to note, it accepted the truism
that IIL tribunals are not to serve as an "appellate tier in respect of the decisions of national
judiciaries." Eli Lilly, Final Award, supra note 6, ¶¶ 221-25.
69. See Philip M. Moremen, Private Rights of Action to Enforce Rules of International
Regimes, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1127, 1129-30, 1142 (2006) (explaining the costs and benefits of
private rights of action in international treaties).
70. See id. at 1129; Claus D. Zimmermann, The Neglected Link Between the Legal
Nature of WTO Rules, the Political Filtering of WTO Disputes, and the Absence of
Retrospective WTO Remedies, 4 TRADE L. & DEV. 251, 261 (2012).
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incompatible with, the remedial schemes of other international
regimes.71 Disputes in the WTO, for example, are resolved purely
through a state-to-state mechanism in which only governments are
authorized to initiate a claim of noncompliance with the WTO
instruments.72 Moreover, the only remedy available for the winning
government is the opportunity to impose roughly equivalent trade
sanctions ("suspension of concessions") on the noncompliant party.73
Philip Morris was able to disrupt this institutional balance by raising
claims of IP-related WTO violations in its investment-treaty-based anti-
smoking litigation with Australia.74
In terms of dispute settlement, NAFTA chapter 17, by its own
terms, was intended to operate similarly to the WTO: claims of
noncompliance with chapter 17, like disputes over compliance with
most other substantive NAFTA obligations, are addressable only
through state-to-state dispute settlement under chapter 20, subject to
NAFTA's denial-of-benefits remedial scheme.75 And yet, IIL allowed Eli
Lilly to skirt around both limitations by equating alleged
noncompliance with chapter 17 to an expropriation and to a violation of
its legitimate expectations of regulatory stability.
Another problematic consequence of allowing investors to
litigate the meaning and application of international IP treaties in an
IIL setting is that adjudicators without expertise ultimately must
interpret and apply IP.76 IIL arbitrators are almost always selected by
the relevant parties for their reputation in and connections to the highly
specialized and elite world of international commercial litigation.77
71. See Marcos D. Garcia Dominguez, Calculating Damages in Investment
Arbitration: Should Tribunals Take Country Risk into Account?, 34 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 95, 118 (2016) ("[ILL] often requires fair market value compensation."); Zimmermann,
supra note 70, at 252 (explaining that the WTO does not allow monetary rewards for party
seeking a remedy).
72. See Zimmermann, supra note 70, at 261.
73. Id. at 253 n.5, 254.
74. See Stephanie Hartmann, When Two International Regimes Collide: An Analysis
of the Tobacco Plain Packaging Disputes and Why Overlapping Jurisdiction of the WTO and
Investment Tribunals Does Not Result in Convergence of Norms, 21 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 204, 224-29 (2017).
75. See NAFTA, supra note 41, ch. 20, arts. 2004, 2019.
76. See, e.g., Eli Lilly, Final Award, supra note 6, ¶ 311 (explaining that the Members
of the Tribunal must reach conclusions of Canadian patent law, which it was previously
unfamiliar with); cf. Jilrgen Kurtz, The Use and Abuse of WTO Law in Investor-State
Arbitration: Competition and its Discontents, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 749, 749-51 (2009)
(describing the tendency of investor-state tribunals to misunderstand and misapply
international law from other international legal regimes).
77. See Sergio Puig, Social Capital in the Arbitration Market, 25 EUR. J. INT'L L. 387,
397 (2014).
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That was the case in Eli Lilly, and it is not surprising, then, to note that
none of the arbitrators had any existing expertise in IP law.7 8 Indeed,
all three were-as is quite typical in IIL-mercenary commercial
litigators who make quite good livings working all sides of the IIL
system, including as counsel for claimants and host states in IIL
arbitrations, as arbitrators, and as quasi academics opining on what IIL
means.7 9 Their incentive-and it is a quite direct and substantial
monetary ones0-is to keep the IIL system going by allowing investors
broad rights to sue states for alleged international wrongs and
furthermore, allowing investors to win frequently enough that they
continue to use the system, but not to win so frequently that states
abandon it. The risk is that this incentive, combined with ignorance,
will lead to arbitral articulations of international IP law that are at odds
with what state-parties desire or that are in conflict with what state-to-
state tribunals directly charged with interpreting international IP
treaties might say that it means.
78. See Eli Lilly, Final Award, supra note 6, ¶ 311 ("[Tlhe Tribunal observes that the
present case is one in which the facts are the law. Thus, this analysis necessarily touches
upon aspects of Canadian patent law previously unfamiliar to Members of the Tribunal.").
79. See id. ¶¶ 12-16 (listing Sir Daniel Bethlehem and Gary Born as arbitrators of
the Tribunal, and Albert Jan van den Berg as President of the Tribunal); Albert Jan Van
Den Berg, HANOTIAU & VAN DEN BERG, http://www.hvdb.com/albert-jan-van-den-berg/
[https://perma.cc/DG3R-WVDW] (last visited Oct. 15, 2018) (listing Albert Jan van den
Berg's involvement in arbitration matters); Gary Born, WILMERHALE,
https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/people/gary-born [https://perma.cc/XBG4-3V5R] (last
visited Oct. 15, 2018) (listing Gary Born's involvement in arbitration matters); Sir Daniel
Bethlehem, 20 ESSEX STREET, https://www.20essexst.com/member/daniel-bethlehem
[https://perma.cc/R9FB-UKCM] (last visited Oct. 15, 2018) (listing Sir Daniel Bethlehem's
involvement in arbitration matters); infra note 80 and sources cited. For a description of this
practice of "double hatting," see generally Fernando Dias Sim6es, Hold on to Your Hat! Issue
Conflicts in the Investment Court System, 17 LAW & PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 98 (2018).
80. ICSID's official schedule of fees sets arbitrator fees at a minimum of USD $3,000
per day plus expenses. Schedule of Fees, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/
icsiddocs/Schedule-of-Fees.aspx [https://perma.cc/2EVN-E94N] (last visited Oct. 15, 2018).
This amount is lower than what elite lawyers regularly charge in private practice. See, e.g.,
Sara Randazzo & Jacqueline Palank, Legal Fees Cross New Mark: $1,500 an Hour, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 9, 2016, 10:11 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/legal-fees-reach-new-pinnacle-1-
500-an-hour-1454960708 [https://perma.cc/J822-HL2V]. However, arbitrators can negotiate
for higher rates than the ICSID minimum. See Schedule of Fees, supra. More importantly,
they can earn market rates (probably in excess of USD $1,000 an hour) representing clients
(investors or host states) in other arbitrations. See Puig, supra note 77, at 400; Deborah
Rothman, Trends in Arbitrator Compensation, ABA DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2017, at 8, 8.
A lawyer's ability to obtain these more lucrative appointments as counsel are presumably
greatly improved by having endured the relative sacrifice of $3,000 per day, as having
"arbitrator" on one's CV effectively signals the lawyer's reputation and influence in the small
and exclusive world of investor-state arbitration. See Puig, supra note 77, at 407. For a sense
of the amount of money involved in the system (and available for lawyers to enjoy), see the
discussion of costs in the Lilly litigation. See Eli Lilly, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, ¶¶ 443-
60.
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B. The FET Claim
Expropriation claims in modern IIL usually fail,81 so it is not
surprising that investors have looked to other treaty text to supply a
more favorable cause of action. The FET clause, ubiquitous in IIL
treaties, serves that purpose well. Investors routinely cast their claims
as violations of their right to FET, as Eli Lilly did here.8 2 The great
benefit of FET as a cause of action is that no one really knows what it
entails.83 Moreover, claimant-investors-including Eli Lilly-tend to
argue that FET, whatever it means, is tied to constantly evolving
customary international law standards.84  These standards, as
articulated by IIL tribunals, are progressively developing into
something significantly stricter than they were at their murky origins.85
This contrasts with tribunal treatment of expropriation claims, which
seems to reflect a comparatively rigid and ungenerous notion of
expropriation under international law.86
81. See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., UNITED NATIONS,
EXPROPRIATION: UNCTAD SERIES ON ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS
II 64 (2012) ("In the majority of cases to date, claims of indirect expropriation have been
dismissed because the negative impact of the measure did not rise to the level of a taking.").
82. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov't of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Claimant's
Reply on the Merits, ¶ 322 (Sept. 11, 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw4384.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3XS-HM2C]; Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A
Unified Theory of Fair and Equitable Treatment, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 43, 44 (2010)
("Since the beginning of the decade, international arbitral tribunals have struggled
unsuccessfully to define the obligation of 'fair and equitable treatment' required by the vast
majority of the world's 2,600 bilateral investment treaties (BITs). Although by the end of
2008 more than fifty awards had been issued by international tribunals interpreting the
standard, none of them purported to offer a unified theory of the standard.").
83. See Vandevelde, supra note 82, at 44. This point may sound more controversial
than the Authors think it is. Even system insiders, such as Dolzer and Schreuer, admit that
the FET standard is a "broad one"-akin to the good faith standard-whose meaning "will
depend on the specific circumstances of the case at issue." See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH
SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 139, 142 (2d ed. 2012). If such
esteemed authorities are taken seriously, the implication is that FET is not terribly effective
at addressing the bugaboo of "legal uncertainty" because, as Jerome Frank argued long ago,
the primary "uncertainty" in many cases will revolve around factual disputes and the
difficulty of predicting how the fact-finder will resolve them. See Jerome Frank, Legal
Thinking in Three Dimensions, 1 SYRACUSE L. REV. 9, 14-15 (1949).
84. See Eli Lilly, Claimant's Memorial, supra note 58, ¶ 254 ("[Als a product of
customary international law, the Minimum Standard of Treatment has continually
evolved . . . ."); Vandevelde, supra note 82, at 66.
85. See Marcela Klein Bronfman, Fair and Equitable Treatment: An Evolving
Standard, 10 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 609, 613, 618 (2006) (tracing the
evolution of the standard).
86. See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., supra note 81, at 6-7, 27.
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The full debate on these legal points is lengthy and
complicated.87 The Authors need not suggest a resolution here, because,
as this Article describes more fully below, the Tribunal again ducked
the difficult international legal questions to resolve the dispute on a
mostly factual inquiry.
Eli Lilly largely framed its FET claim around the concept of
"legitimate expectations."88 The basic idea was famously articulated in
its most extreme form in Tecmed v. Mexico:
The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, free from
ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so that
it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its
investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative practices
or directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply with such regulations.8 9
The Tecmed rule fetishizes legal certainty and exaggerates the
inability of potential investors to plan around it or their willingness to
invest in the presence of it.90 It is nonetheless unsurprising-indeed, it
is quite expected-that foreign investors would continually seize upon
Tecmed's incautious language to claim an international legal right to
"know beforehand any and all rules"-the very language that Eli Lilly
cites and italicizes for emphasis as supporting its FET claim.91
Interestingly, the Eli Lilly tribunal completely avoids citing to
the Tecmed case, and it does not offer any explicit sense of what it
thinks FET means. It does accept, however, at least provisionally, Eli
Lilly's claim that a "dramatic change" in Canadian patent law would
violate article 1105. Under the Tribunal's interpretation of its task, it
had to determine whether Eli Lilly had succeeded in proving that the
Canadian courts had "depart[ed] dramatically from prior Canadian
87. For an overview of complex debates about the meaning of FET, see generally
DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 83.
88. Eli Lilly, Final Award, supra note 6, T 261. Eli Lilly made subsidiary FET
arguments around the concepts of arbitrariness and discrimination. See id. ¶¶ 390, 397. The
Authors discuss these alternatives only in passing, as they were rejected rather cursorily by
the Tribunal. See id. ¶ 442.
89. T6cnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID
Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 154 (May 29, 2003) [hereinafter TECMED],
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/itaOS54.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4LTA-CJDJI.
90. See id.; cf. Diane Lourdes Dick, Confronting the Certainty Imperative in
Corporate Finance Jurisprudence, 4 UTAH L. REV. 1461, 1466-67 (2011) (describing how an
exaggerated emphasis on legal certainty in business and financial law undesirably dissuades
judges from reforming the law in ways that advance other societal goals); A. A. Fatouros,
International Economic Development and the Illusion of Legal Certainty, 57 PROC. AM. SOC'Y
INT'L L. 117, 120-25 (1963) (arguing that analysts exaggerate the extent to which foreign
direct investors are incapable of dealing with legal uncertainty).
91. Eli Lilly, Claimant's Memorial, supra note 58, T 272 n.500.
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patent law."92 The Tribunal's embrace of a "dramatic change" theory of
FET is not unprecedented; a tribunal in one of several claims against
Spain's changes to its solar energy subsidy regime accepted such a
theory as well.9 3 However, in the Spanish case, there was at least some
evidence that the investor had been specifically induced to make a
substantial investment on the basis of a promise of legal stability.94
Moreover, in the Spanish case, the tribunal's analysis of the FET
standard was not chained to a restrictive notion of customary
international law, as is FET under NAFTA chapter 11 and the FTC
interpretive note.95 The Eli Lilly tribunal's embrace of the dramatic
change theory is thus quite remarkable, both because it does not seem
to require a specific commitment of legal stability or evidence of reliance
on such a commitment, and because it ignores the FTC's attempt to
cabin FET as a truly "minimum" standard of treatment.
The determination of dramatic domestic legal change required,
as the Tribunal describes it, an essentially "factual" inquiry of
Canadian law.9 6 That inquiry led the Tribunal to closely read a handful
of Canadian court cases that, in the Tribunal's view, illustrated that
while the promise utility doctrine played no significant role in Canadian
jurisprudence or patent practice until 2005, the basic idea was
nonetheless "out there"-or at least hinted at-in earlier cases.97 This
meant that Eli Lilly was effectively on notice of the possibility that a
Canadian court might formally adopt the doctrine, a possibility "to be
ignored at a patentee's peril."9 8 As to other aspects of the Canadian
patent law regime that Eli Lilly also characterized as impermissible
dramatic changes, the Tribunal disagreed: "based on the record, that
change is more incremental and evolutionary than dramatic."99
92. Eli Lilly, Final Award, supra note 6, T 307.
93. See Eiser Infrastructure Ltd. & Energia Solar Luxembourg S.i r.l. v. Kingdom of
Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, Final Award, IT 363-87 (May 4, 2017),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw9O5O.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8Z32-5JYX].
94. See id. TT 110-12, 126.
95. This is because the Spanish case was not brought under NAFTA, but rather
under the Energy Charter Treaty, which is not subject to the FTC interpretation. See id. ¶¶
155, 357; North American Free Trade Agreement: Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter
11 Provisions, ORG. AM. STATES: FOREIGN TRADE INFO. SYS. (July 31, 2001),
http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/CHlunderstanding-e.asp [htt s://perma.cc/
C3P5-CTSA].
96. Eli Lilly, Final Award, supra note 6, ¶ 311.
97. See id. ¶ 324.
98. See id.
99. Id. T 350.
534 [Vol. 21:2:517
CHALLENGING A NEO-FEDERAL IP REGIME
C. Eli Lilly As a Threat to the Neo-Federalist Vision?
"Drama," then, was declared to be the touchstone of a violation
of IIL, and the evolution of Canada's IP law was found to lack it.
Although the case raised a number of difficult and sensitive questions,
and could easily have proven a blockbuster of a decision, the arbitrators
chose not to address these issues. Instead, what we have is a rather
dull and slimly reasoned award that largely repeats the parties'
arguments while dodging the exciting legal questions.
The case nonetheless raises bigger, systemic issues that are
worth discussing. In particular, it serves as a wonderful example of
how investors invoke international IP instruments-such as NAFTA
chapter 17-as setting regional, or even global, standards from which
states may not deviate. By invoking international IP instruments,
investors place inexpert arbitrators in the uncomfortable position of
having to opine authoritatively on a field of law about which they know
very little or nothing.100 This creates the obvious risk of undesirable
and inconsistent statements regarding what ILL permits or requires.
To the extent that IIL arbitrators are conditioned to protect such
investor-friendly values as legal predictability and stability,
operationalized through the concept of "legitimate expectations," they
may be especially prone to interpret flexible or even nonbinding
international IP law as establishing global standards from which states
shall not stray.
Eli Lilly argued that chapter 17, along with the Patent
Cooperation Treaty, implicitly established the mere scintilla standard
of utility as the NAFTA standard.101 But its "international standard"
argument went beyond formal international treaties to rely on the
alleged uniformity of national practices to create binding global norms.
Eli Lilly emphasized again and again that Canada's promise utility
doctrine was "unique," a deviation not just from Mexican and US
practice, but from the practice of virtually every other country in the
world.102 Eli Lilly's argument was that if every other relevant country
applied a mere scintilla test, then Canada had to as well.
100. As the Eli Lilly arbitrators admitted themselves, see id. ¶ 311 ("Finally, the
Tribunal observes that the present case is one in which the facts are the law. Thus, this
analysis necessarily touches upon aspects of Canadian patent law previously unfamiliar to
the Members of the Tribunal.").
101. See Eli Lilly, Claimant's Memorial, supra note 58, ¶¶ 185-86.
102. See id. ¶T 1, 4, 8-9; Eli Lilly, Final Award, supra note 6, ¶¶ 377-79. Eli Lilly uses
the word "unique" eleven times in its Claimant's Memorial to describe Canada's promise
utility doctrine. See Eli Lilly, Claimant's Memorial, supra note 58, ¶¶ 1, 4, 8-9, 12, 20, 79,
213-14, 243, 279.
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The Eli Lilly Tribunal admittedly did not take the bait. It
avoided saying anything about what chapter 17 meant, and it did little
analytically with the extensive expert testimony that the parties
presented on Mexican and US IP law. 103 But it is not hard to imagine
a different IP case taking a global standard argument more seriously.
Indeed, a good example involves Eli Lilly's own arbitrator, Gary Born,
in a remarkable partial dissent to the award in Philip Morris's (PM) IIL
challenge to Uruguay's anti-smoking legislation.10 4 In that case, PM
103. See Eli Lilly, Final Award, supra note 6, ¶¶ 377-79. The Tribunal disposes with
Lilly's extensive comparative-law analysis in three laconic paragraphs. See id.
104. See Philip Morris Brands Srl v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No.
ARB/10/7, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Co-Arbitrator Gary Born, T 86 (July 8,
2016) [hereinafter Philip Morris, Gary Born Dissenting Opinion],
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7428.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M79X-KMMZ]. Born is well-known in investment arbitration circles as
having established a reputation as a claimant's arbitrator, with reliably pro-investor views
of IIL. See, e.g., Antaris Solar GmbH v. Czech, PCA Case No. 2014-01, Dissenting Opinion of
Gary Born, TT 10, 32 (May 2, 2018), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw9810.pdf [https://perma.cc/GYT9-LBM8] (taking a pro-investor position);
Gary Born, supra note 79 ("Gary Born is the chair of the International Arbitration Practice
Group. Mr. Born is widely regarded as the world's preeminent authority on international
commercial arbitration and international litigation."). Born has served or is serving as
arbitrator for eleven ICSID disputes and has been appointed by the investor-claimant in ten
of those disputes. See, e.g., Biwater Gauff (Tanz.) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanz., ICSID
Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, ¶ 25 (July 24, 2008), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/ita0095.pdf [https://perma.cc/BZ7J-ZEER]; Eli Lilly, Final Award, supra
note 6, T 12; KS Invest GmbH & TLS Invest GmbH v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No.
ARB/15/25, Decision on the Proposal to Disqualify Professor Gary Born, Arbitrator, ¶ 6 (Apr.
30, 2018), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw9735.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KCR7-KNZD]; Philip Morris Brands Sirl v. Oriental Republic of Uru.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, $ 18 (July 8, 2016) [hereinafter Philip Morris, Award],
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7417.pdf [https://perma.ec/
76FD-8Q69]; Case Details: B-Mex, LLC and others v. United Mexican States (ICSID Case No.
ARB (AF)/16/3), ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?Case
No=ARB(AF)/16/3 [https://perma.cc/5PC9-WS8S] (last visited Oct. 15, 2018); Case Details:
Global Telecom Holding S.A.E. v. Canada (ICSID Case No. ARB/16/16), ICSID,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/16/16
[https://perma.cc/J256-PMPC] (last visited Oct. 15, 2018); Case Details: JSC Tashkent
Mechanical Plant and others v. Kyrgyz Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/16/4), ICSID,
https://icsid.worldbank.orglen/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB(AF)/16/4
[https://perma.cc/7N98-93BF] (last visited Oct. 15, 2018); Hanocal Holding B.V. and IPIC
International B.V v. Republic of Korea (ICSID Case No. ARB/15/17), INVEST. POL'Y HUB,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/635 [https://perma.cc/6ZS6-YFUL] (last
visited Oct. 15, 2018). In the eleventh, he serves as president. See PNG Sustainable
Development Program Ltd. v. Independent State of Papua N.G., ICSID Case No. ARB/13/33,
Award, ¶ 7 (May 5, 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw4257.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2TV-3GPA]. These statistics are taken from
the ICSID and italaw websites. See Arbitrator: Gary Born, ITALAW,
https://www.italaw.com/arbitrators/gary-born [https://perma.cc/QB9G-UPCB] (last visited
Oct. 15, 2018); ICSID Arbitrator/Conciliator: Mr. Gary B. Born, ICSID,
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challenged Uruguay's limitations on the use of the PM trademark as an
expropriation and violation of FET.105 PM lost, no doubt due to
arbitrator concerns that a ruling in PM's favor would risk spurring a
backlash against IIL as giving legal cover to a socially harmful and
irresponsible industry.106 Born, though, would have given PM at least
a partial victory. In his view, Uruguay's "single presentation"
requirement-which strictly limited the forms in which PM could use
its trademarks-was impermissibly arbitrary.107 Uruguay's single-
presentation rule was arbitrary, Born emphasized, because it was
"internationally unique" and "not adopted by any other country in the
world."108 Born also found it relevant that the WHO's Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control did not discuss single presentation as a
policy instrument.109
For Born, this uniform global practice imposed a heightened
burden on Uruguay to prove that its deviation from that practice was
"rational" in a policy sense.110 Because Uruguay had not proveii that
its "unique" single-presentation restriction on PM's trademark rights
was a rational means of achieving Uruguay's public health goals, Born
opined that the restriction should have been found to be a violation of
PM's right to be treated fairly and equitably under IIL. 111 The
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/arbitrators/ViewProfile.aspx?cvid=223
[https://perma.cc/8NNG-Z5SU] (last visited Oct. 15, 2018).
105. See Philip Morris, Award, supra note 104, ¶¶ 9, 12.
106. See id. T 270, 271; Ankita Ritwik, Note, Tobacco Packaging Arbitration and the
State's Ability to Legislate, 54 HARV. INT'L L.J. 523, 536, 537 (2013). In fact, PM's aggressive
use of IIL to challenge anti-smoking regulations in Australia and Uruguay did lead to a
backlash. See Christopher Knaus, Philip Morris Cigarettes Charged Millions After Losing
Plain Packaging Case Against Australia, GUARDIAN, (July 9, 2017, 8:47 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/jul/10/philip-morris-cigarettes-charged-
millions-after-losing-plain-packaging-case-against-australia [https:/perma.ccl8CUR-SJSU];
Cecilia Olivet & Alberto Villareal, Who Really Won the Legal Battle Between Philip Morris
and Uruguay?, GUARDIAN (July 28, 2016, 7:42 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2016/jul/28/who-really-won-legal-battle-philip-morris-uruguay-cigarette-
adverts [https://perma.cc/95PW-BN5K]; Ryan Parker, John Oliver Targets Cigarettes on
'Last Week Tonight'; Philip Morris Reacts, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2015, 3:55 PM),
http://www.latimes.comlentertainment/tv/showtracker/a-et-st-philip-morris-john-oliver-
20150216-story.html# [https://perma.cc/GX3V-MKKZ]. The last draft of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) allowed member states to exclude the tobacco industry from TPP's
investor-state arbitration mechanism. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP ch. 29, art. 29.5 (2015)
[hereinafter TPP AGREEMENT], https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-
Exceptions-and-General-Provisions.pdf [https://perma.c/2MJX-G6WZ].
107. Philip Morris, Gary Born Dissenting Opinion, supra note 104, ¶ 86.
108. Id.
109. See id. ¶T 94, 99.
110. See id. ¶¶ 86-88.
111. See id.
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implication of Born's position for a neo-federalist model is quite clear:
through the intersection of IIL, comparative global practice, and
international treaties, a state's ability to experiment with particular IP
arrangements is restricted.
Eli Lilly also demonstrates that the IIL system can be used to
limit domestic IP policy autonomy without reference to global or
comparative IP rules or norms. It does so through the operation of the
"legitimate expectations" doctrine, articulated in the Tecmed decision
and quoted above.112 That doctrine suggests that investors have an
international law right-in at least some circumstances-to stability in
the domestic laws and regulations governing their investment.
"Stabilization clauses" have long been a part of international
practice of state contracts, particularly in the natural-resource
sectors.113 In those cases, the foreign investor negotiates a clause in a
contract with the state through which the state formally and explicitly
promises not to change relevant laws in ways that prejudice the
investment project.11 4 While the legal effect and the policy wisdom of
such clauses was much debated in the 1970s,11 5 these days it is quite
clear that international arbitral tribunals will enforce them in most
circumstances.116 The modern legitimate expectations doctrine takes
this concept a step further by threatening to expand a rather
extraordinary right of legal stability outside of the contract setting, in
which rights were enforceable only when specifically negotiated on a
project-by-project basis.
On the basis of this expanded modern doctrine, Eli Lilly insisted
that it was entitled to a stable domestic legal environment "even in the
absence of specific promises by the government."117 This is because the
foreign investor is fundamentally concerned with "planning and
stability" when making the investment, such that its "legitimate
expectations . . . will be grounded in the legal order as it stands at the
time the investor acquires the investment."11 8 The state must then
112. See supra Section IV.B.
113. See Thomas Walde, Negotiating for Dispute Settlement in Transnational Mineral
Contracts: Current Practice, Trends, and an Evaluation from the Host Country's Perspective,
7 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 33, 33, 64, 68 (1977).
114. See id. at 66-67.
115. See, e.g., Thomas Walde, Revision of Transnational Investment Agreements:
Contractual Flexibility in Natural Resources Development, 10 LAW. AMS. 265, 265-66, 272
n.25 (1978) (advocating the use of renegotiation clauses rather than stability clauses).
116. See Alisher Umirdinov, The End of Hibernation of Stabilization Clause in
Investment Arbitration: Reassessing Its Contribution to Sustainable Development, 43
DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 455, 455-56 (2015).
117. Eli Lilly, Claimant's Memorial, supra note 58, T 272.
118. Id. ¶ 273.
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"take into account" those expectations when deciding whether to
proceed with a law reform effort.119 The more "dramatic" and "outside
the acceptable margin of change" the reform is, the more likely that the
state will, under FET, be required to pay compensation to the
investor.120
Eli Lilly's position on FET and the legitimate expectations
doctrine is controversial among IIL scholars,121 and the Tribunal did not
explicitly adopt it as the proper understanding of NAFTA article 1105.
All the same, it is important to note that the Tribunal did not reject it
either. Moreover, it proceeded, without much legal analysis, to analyze
the factual basis of Eli Lilly's claim of "dramatic" legal change as if
dramatic legal change would have violated FET.122 The Eli Lilly award
may thus be seen as a tactical loss, but also as a strategic win for
investors who plan to make FET claims in the future-including claims
against the United States, whose IP laws have also been known to
change "dramatically" on occasion.123 The award now enters into the
stream of IIL jurisprudence as an example of a tribunal apparently
taking quite seriously the notion that investors enjoy a freestanding
and enforceable international legal right to be free from uncompensated
"dramatic" changes in domestic law. While NAFTA chapter 11 awards
technically have no precedential value for future cases, the IIL system's
most influential insiders are quite open in claiming their arbitral
jurisprudence develops into binding norms of customary international
law that, as custom, are especially difficult for states to alter or avoid.1 2 4
119. Id.
120. Id. ¶ 279.
121. See, e.g., Brook K. Baker & Katrina Geddes, The Incredible Shrinking Victory:
Eli Lilly v. Canada, Success, Judicial Reversal, and Continuing Threats from Pharmaceutical
ISDS, 49 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 479, 480-81 (2017); Okediji, supra note 37, at 1129.
122. See Eli Lilly, Final Award, supra note 6, ¶ 307.
123. For example, the 2011 America Investments Act has been described as the "most
dramatic change in the history of U.S. patent law" and as having "far-reaching effects in both
patent prosecution and litigation." See GESMER UPDEGROVE LLP, CLIENT ADVISORY:
HISTORIC NEW PATENT LAW ENACTED, IMPOSING WIDE RANGING CHANGES (Sept. 2011),
https://www.gesmer.comluploads/29/doc/AdvisorySepL201l.pdf [https://perma.ce/5HCU-
3GHS]. US IP case law also sometimes produces allegedly "dramatic" changes. See, e.g., Teva
Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835-36 (2015) (overturning a long line of
federal circuit precedent on the standard of review for district court factual determinations
regarding claim construction).
124. See International Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. The United Mexican States,
UNCITRAL, Separate Opinion of Thomas Wdlde, ¶ 16 (Dec. 1, 2005),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0432.pdf [https://perma.cc/
X6JB-JFU5] ("While individual arbitral awards by themselves do not as yet constitute a
binding precedent, a consistent line of reasoning developing a principle and a particular
interpretation of specific treaty obligations should be respected; if an authoritative
jurisprudence evolves, it will acquire the character of customary international law and must
2018] 539
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
From a neo-federalist perspective, the Eli Lilly award exists as
a persuasively authoritative example of a unanimous IIL tribunal
taking seriously an investor's legal claim that IIL serves to prohibit the
state from, at least in some circumstances, making adjustments to IP
law where such changes serve to weaken IP protections and, especially,
where such changes represent deviations from international practice.
And while Eli Lilly's factual argument was focused on the role of
Canadian courts in the allegedly dramatic adoption of the promise
utility doctrine, it is important to note that nothing in Eli Lilly's
argument limits its application to court-led legal change. The IIL
principles upon which Eli Lilly relied (and which the Tribunal seems to
have accepted) apply just as well to executive and legislative policy
changes. In other words, Eli Lilly does not simply stand for the
principle that courts cannot "dramatically" change IP law; instead, it
stands for the proposition that no state governing body can do so
without triggering potentially massive financial liability.
V. THE QUESTION OF COSTS
Investment treaty arbitration, like international commercial
arbitration, is sometimes justified on the ground that it promotes more
efficient settlement of international disputes.125 A closely related
argument is that investment treaty arbitration serves to "depoliticize"
investor-state dispute settlement.126 It is striking, then, to observe how
complex, expensive, and political investment arbitration of IP disputes
has proven to be. In some ways, the PM litigation against Australia is
an even better example of this phenomenon. PM's expropriation claim
against Australia for the latter's anti-smoking legislation followed a full
litigation of the essence of its claim before the High Court of
be respected.. . An increasingly continuous, uncontested and consistent modern arbitral
jurisprudence is part of the authoritative source of international law . . . ." (footnote
omitted)). For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Jason Webb Yackee, Controlling
the International Investment Law Agency, 53 HARV. INT'L L.J. 391, 427 (2012).
125. See Ryan Thomas, International Arbitration & Global Governance: Contending
Theories and Evidence, 7 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 377, 380 (2015). In this sense, efficiency
does not refer to economists' technical concept, but rather, more colloquially, that arbitration
might be faster, cheaper, and less complex than alternative modes of dispute settlement,
such as domestic court litigation or diplomatic protection. See Lars Markert, Improving
Efficiency in Investment Arbitration, 4 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 215, 216 (2011).
126. See Martins Paparinskis, The Limits of Depoliticisation in Contemporary
Investor-State Arbitration, in 3 SELECT PROC. EUR. Soc. INT'L L. 271, 271 (James Crawford
and Sarah Nouwen eds., 2010) ("The contemporary State practice, case law and legal
writings consider it almost axiomatic that depoliticisation is the purpose of investment
protection regime (even if differing about its implications and the degree of successful
achievement." (footnotes omitted)).
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Australia.127 The Australian court issued an extensively reasoned
41,000 word opinion detailing its reasons for holding that the legislation
did not amount to a taking of tobacco-company IP under Australian
law.128
While in domestic legal systems, such a decision by the
territory's highest court would have precedential effect that would
quash future attempts to litigate the same issue, PM was able to seek
the proverbial second bite at the apple by recasting the claim as a
violation of the Hong Kong-Australia BIT, raising highly complicated
and contentious issues touching on both the right of states under
international law to regulate in the public interest, as well as the
relation between international trade, international health, and
international investment treaties.129 Moreover, in the BIT proceedings,
the Australian High Court's interpretation and application of
Australian law would be entirely irrelevant, because the international
legal concept of "expropriation" exists relatively autonomously from
domestic conceptions.130
PM filed its BIT claim in June 2011.131 Nearly five years and
sixteen procedural orders later, the Tribunal threw out the claim on a
jurisdictional technicality.13 2 Philip Morris's lawsuit proved highly
politically controversial, as perhaps best evidenced by a biting
monologue by television comedian John Oliver.133 The lawsuit was seen
127. See JT Int'l SA v. Commonwealth [2012] HCA 43, 250 CLR 1, 24, 50 (Austl.).
Philip Morris was not a party to that litigation, though it did participate as an official
intervenor. See id.
128. See id. at 2-3. It is interesting to note, too, that the domestic proceedings were
efficient in the sense of taking just nine months to complete-from the writ of summons in
December of 2011 to the judgment in August 2012. See Daniel Fletcher, JTInternational SA
v. Commonwealth: Tobacco Plain Packaging, 35 SYDNEY L. REV. 827, 830 n.39 (2013).
129. See Sergio Puig, The Internationalization of Tobacco Tactics, 28 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 495, 497, 498-99, 506-07 (2018) (describing the complex, multiregime aspects of
Philip Morris's tobacco litigation).
130. See Rudolf Dolzer, New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien
Property, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 553, 569-70 (1981).
131. See Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. The Commonwealth of Austl., UNCITRAL, PCA
Case No. 2012-12, Notification of Claim, ¶ 1 (June 22, 2011),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0664.pdf [https://perma.cc/
EB8D-ZC45].
132. See Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. The Commonwealth of Austl., UNCITRAL, PCA
Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶¶ 11-12, 88, 588 (Dec. 17, 2015)
[hereinafter Philip Morris, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility],
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7303_O.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9RVL-FPL7].
133. See Sergio Puig, Tobacco Litigation in International Courts, 57 HARV. INT'L L.J.
383, 396 (2016); Parker, supra note 106. The monologue was delivered on February 15, 2015
for the television show "Last Week Tonight." See Parker, supra note 106.
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as such a threat to the general public's acceptance of the ILL regime
that the negotiators for the now-defunct Trans-Pacific Partnership
specifically excluded much of the tobacco industry from investor-state
dispute-settlement provisions.134 In the process of defending itself,
Australia's government spent, by some accounts, AUD $50 million in
legal costs.1 3 5 Because of the great political sensitivity of the matter in
Australia, the actual costs are, literally, a state secret. The Australian
government refuses to disclose them, and they are redacted from the
tribunal's order on cost sharing.136 The lack of transparency is striking,
given that the trend in investor-state arbitration has been precisely in
the opposite direction, especially as to disputes that so obviously raise
concerns of wide public interest.137 The Philip Morris case illustrates
how using investment treaties to litigate the boundaries between
domestic and international IP and expropriation-type laws can
ironically be highly inefficient from a cost and time perspective, and
highly politically controversial.1 38
134. See TPP AGREEMENT, supra note 106, art. 29.5.
135. See Knaus, supra note 106.
136. See Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. The Commonwealth of Austl., UNCITRAL, PCA
Case No. 2012-12, Final Award Regarding Costs, T 72 (Mar. 8, 2017),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw9212.pdf
[https://perma.cc/49WY-RBX4]; Knaus, supra note 106.
137. See Jarrod Wong & Jason Yackee, The 2006 Procedural and Transparency-
Related Amendments to the ICSID Arbitration Rules: Model Intentions, Moderate Proposals,
and Modest Returns, in THE YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY 2009-2010 at 233,
250, 265, 268 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2010) (discussing increasing
transparency in international investment arbitration); Julia Salasky & Corinne Montineri,
Transparency in Investor-State Arbitration: The New UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency,
INVEST. POL'Y HUB (Mar. 26, 2014), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Blog/Index/29
[https://perma.cc/S2J3-6NAQ].
138. See Philip Morris, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra note 132, TT
11-12, 88; Knaus, supra note 106; Parker, supra note 106. Pfizer's ongoing litigation against
Ecuador for allegedly improper interference with its Ecuadorian patent rights to Viagra
provides another example. See Craig C. Martin, Avoiding the Inefficiency of Litigation, 15
PRETRIAL PRAC. & DISCOVERY, Spring 2007, at 1, https://jenner.com/system/assets/
publications/2105/original/PP D_ MartinSpring07.pdf'91315506713 [https://perma.cc/J6F3-
LKKP]. For a description of this dispute, see Zoe Williams, Another Big Pharma Company
(Pfizer) Invokes Investment Treaty Protections, Complaining That Local Courts Are
Wrongfully Infringing on Patents, IA REP. (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.iareporter.com/
articles/another-big-pharma-company-invokes-investment-treaty-protections-complaining-
that-local-courts-are-wrongly-infringing-on-patents/ (on file with authors). The account
contains evidence that the US government intervened diplomatically in the dispute in an
almost comically juvenile way-it withdrew a visa issued to a former Ecudorian minister and
politician in retaliation for his legal involvement in domestic court proceedings against
Pfizer. See id. The (well-supported) allegation of diplomatic sanctions is striking because the
sanctions occurred despite the presence of the US-Ecuador investment treaty. See LISE
JOHNSON ET AL., COLUMBIA CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV., COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
INVESTMENT TREATIES: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATES 9 (2018) ("Another key
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The Eli Lilly case never achieved the same level of public
notoriety, perhaps because of the way it was framed around the
legalistic and technical issue of the utility doctrine, but it nonetheless
offers some similar lessons. Eli Lilly submitted its notice of intent in
November 2012.139 The final award was not rendered until over four
years hence, in March of 2017.140 The claimant alone submitted "almost
600 pages of submissions, 545 exhibits, and 22 expert reports and
witness statements."141 The entire process produced over ninety
publicly available documents, included eight days of hearings, and
involved an astounding quantity of witnesses and interveners.142 Six
amici presented their views, as did a battle royale of experts and
counter-experts offering their opinions and "reply" opinions.143
Both sides, unsurprisingly, incurred high litigation expenses.
Eli Lilly spent nearly USD $1 million on experts and witnesses alone.144
The company's total expenses amounted, it claimed, to USD $9.43
million, the majority of which was allocated to white-shoe international
law firm Covington and Burling.145 There are lesser, but still
purported benefit of investment treaties is that, by enabling investors to bring claims directly
against the states in which they have invested, the treaties 'depoliticize' those disputes.").
See generally Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Ecuador-U.S., Aug.
27, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. No. 103-15 (1993). The depoliticization justification for IIL,
however, typically asserts that investment treaties are valuable because they discourage
home state governments from "politicizing" investment disputes precisely in the way that
the Pfizer dispute seems to have been politicized. See JOHNSON ET AL., supra.
139. See Eli Lilly, Notice of Intent, supra note 41, at 27.
140. See generally Eli Lilly, Final Award, supra note 6.
141. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov't of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Government of
Canada Submission on Costs, ¶ 11 (Aug. 22, 2016) [hereinafter Eli Lilly, Government of
Canada Submission on Costs], https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw7527.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3J7-3CQD] [hereinafter Eli Lilly, Government
of Canada Submission on Costs].
142. See generally Case Details: Eli Lilly and Company v. Canada (ICSID Case No.
UNCT/14/2), ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=
UNCT%2fl4%2f2 [https://perma.cclT4T7-3VPV] (last visited Oct. 16, 2018); Eli Lilly and
Company v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, ITALAW,
https://www.italaw.com/cases/1625 [https://perma.cclU9GT-WJFJ] (last visited Oct. 16,
2018).
143. See Case Details: Eli Lilly and Company v. Canada (ICSID Case No.
UNCT/14/2), supra note 142; Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada,
UNCITRAL, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, supra note 142.
144. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov't of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Claimant's
Submission on Costs, ¶ 13 (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw7526.pdf [https://perma.cc/D442-ECAW].
145. See id. ¶¶ 12-13.
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significant, expenditures on Canada's side too.14 6 Canada estimated its
total expenditures at CAD $5.9 million, or roughly USD $4.4 million at
the 1:0.75 exchange rate at the time of this Article. 147 More strikingly,
Canada's response to the case consumed over twenty thousand hours of
legal work by government attorneys and paralegals, in addition to the
time expended (and billed) by any of Canada's numerous experts, the
services of outside counsel Dimock Stratton, and other consultants and
contractors.148
On the one hand, the Tribunal awarded partial costs to Canada,
ordering Eli Lilly to pay 75 percent of Canada's bills, and so the point
here is not necessarily that the litigation depleted Canada's wallet.149
On the other hand, the amount of time and expense incurred in the
litigation overall illustrates that whatever investment-treaty
arbitration is, it is very far from the idealized model of a fast and
efficient "alternative" mode of dispute settlement. Indeed, the Eli Lilly
litigation was expensive, complicated, and time consuming. It appears
all the more wasteful and redundant given that the Canadian Supreme
Court overturned the promise utility doctrine line of cases in a
judgement issued just three months after the signature of the
Tribunal's final award.150
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The Eli Lilly case illustrates, in part, the more questionable
aspects of the modern system of investor-state arbitration. This Article
highlights some of those aspects above, but further notes that the
regime allows, and even encourages, investors to denigrate as
hopelessly inept domestic politico-legal systems generally recognized as
being of the highest order. For example, the World Bank's Worldwide
Governance Indicators rank Canada at the 94th percentile or higher in
terms of "Rule of Law," "Government Effectiveness," and "Regulatory
Quality."15 1 And yet IIL provided Eli Lilly with a framework in which
146. See Eli Lilly, Government of Canada Submission on Costs, supra note 141, ¶¶ 14,
16-17.
147. See id. at 10-11; Currency Converter, OANDA CORP., https://www.oanda.com/
currency/converter/ [https://perma.ce/FGT4-VX9Z] (last visited Dec. 8, 2018).
148. See Eli Lilly, Government of Canada Submission on Costs, supra note 141, at 10-
11.
149. See Eli Lilly, Final Award, supra note 6, TT 478-79 (Mar. 16, 2017),
https://www.italaw.comlsites/default/files/case-documents/italaw8546.pdf [https://perma.cc/
X8ZL-8886].
150. See AstraZeneca Can. Inc. v. Apotex Inc., [2017] 1 S.C.R. 943, 944 (Can.).
151. See DataBank: Worldwide Governance Indicators, WORLD BANK,
http://databank.worldbank.org/datalsource/worldwide-governance-indicators
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to argue-in all apparent seriousness-that Canadian courts, steeped
in hundreds of years of common-law tradition, were functionally
incapable of applying the promise utility doctrine in anything other
than an "arbitrary and unpredictable" way.152
The Eli Lilly case also illustrates certain ironies, two of which
will follow. The first is that while Eli Lilly made much in the arbitral
proceedings of the company's exquisite sensitivity to legal instability
and of Canada's deviation from an alleged global uniformity of IP law,
its communications to investors contrastingly emphasize that legal
instability and a lack of uniformity are an inherent and inescapable
part of the world in which it does business and in which it regularly
earns billions of dollars in annual net income.153 The second is that
while Eli Lilly was castigating Canadian courts for their supposed
inability to fairly manage and apply vague legal standards, it was
expressly entrusting the IIL tribunal to do the same. If the promise
utility doctrine is too meaningless for judicial management and
application, then so too, presumably, should be the doctrine of fair and
equitable treatment. And yet Eli Lilly is not only more than
comfortable with an IlL tribunal-inexpert in IP law, amateur at
judging-applying such a contentless standard, it is further comfortable
with it doing so in a legal environment in which the FET doctrine-
emphasized with approval by Eli Lilly-itself "continually evolve[s]"
through a common-law process.154
To return to the bigger picture: IIL's private right of action is
typically justified as necessary to combat certain pathological state
tendencies, such as the obsolescing-bargain dynamic mentioned above,
or perhaps a more general tendency to discriminate against foreigner
owners of capital, who may be systematically disadvantaged in their
[https://perma.cc/T398-GTXU] (last visited Oct. 16, 2018). Rankings are from 2016, and are
available at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=Worldwide-
Governance-Indicators. See id. Canada scores equivalently high in earlier years. See id.
152. See Eli Lilly, Claimant's Memorial, supra note 58, ¶ 61 ("Identifying the patent's
promise' is inherently arbitrary and unpredictable."). Id. ¶ 263 ("[T]he promise utility
doctrine requires judges to undertake the inherently unpredictable task of identifying the
Ipromises' contained in a patent.") Id. ¶ 265 ("[Tlhe promise utility doctrine is arbitrary and
unpredictable because [it allows] judges [to] second guess the scientific evidence . . . .").
153. See id. ¶¶ 26, 35-36, 56-57; ELI LILLY AND Co., 2017 FINANCIAL REPORT at F18,
F22 (2017), https://assets.ctfassets.net/hadumfdtzsrul4RVXuVeg9ai0gWWColYeGc/
9060d43866886d7bb5ce492f0329ac79/2017_LillyFinancial Report-2018_ProxyStateme
nt.pdf [https://perma.cc/X622-DPNQ] ("Intellectual property protection varies throughout
the world and is subject to change over time."). For data on Eli Lilly's financial performance,
see Eli Lilly and Co., MORNINGSTAR, http://financials.morningstar.com/ratios/r.html?t=LLY
[https://perma.cc/KKP7-X7S4] (last visited Oct. 16, 2018).
154. See Eli Lilly, Final Award, supra note 6, T 311; Eli Lilly, Claimant's Memorial,
supra note 58, TT 250, 254.
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ability to access and influence the domestic political process.155 But
neither scenario applied to Eli Lilly's case. Eli Lilly did not claim that
the development or application of the promise utility doctrine was
motivated by anti-foreigner bias-perhaps because its opponent in the
underlying, original IP litigation was itself a subsidiary of an Israeli
drug company.156 Nor was Canada seizing Eli Lilly's capital-intensive
investments for its own enjoyment. Instead, Canadian courts were
wrestling in apparent good faith with how best to apply and adapt a
relatively open-ended and somewhat outdated statute-the Canadian
Patent Act of 1985-to an industry whose activities raise difficult and
contested questions of public policy. 15 7 It is by no means clear, by the
justificatory logic of the IIL regime itself, why Canadian courts and the
Canadian political system were not a perfectly adequate forum for
deciding whether the promise utility doctrine was or was not permitted
under Canadian law. The desirability of a preference for domestic
solutions is especially high, as Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss persuasively
argue, in the rapidly changing and morally fraught worlds of
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology.
This does not mean, of course, that domestic regimes can be
trusted to always get international IP "right." But it is also probably
true that states do not have serious incentives to get it "wrong" very
often, at least not in a serious way. Internal political as well as
international competitive pressures should serve to disincentivize
155. See John F. Coyle & Jason Webb Yackee, Reviving the Treaty of Friendship:
Enforcing International Investment Law in U.S. Courts, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 61, 63 (2017);
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41 HARV. INT'L. L.J.
469, 469-70, 488 (2000). On investment treaties as tools to prevent discrimination against
foreign-owned capital, see Vandevelde, supra, at 500.
156. See E. Richard Gold, Eli Lilly's Canadian Odyssey to Use a Fake Rule and Fake
News to Protect Bad Patents, STAT NEWS (Aug. 16, 2017),
https://www.statnews.com/2017/08/16/eli-lilly-canada-patents-zyprexa-strattera/
[https://perma.cc/PNG5-RTLH]. The underlying Canadian litigation over the relevant
patents was between Eli Lilly and Novapharm, a Canadian drug company acquired by Teva,
an Israeli drug company, in 2000. See Teva Announces Completion of Novopharm
Acquisition, TEVA (Apr. 5, 2000) https://www.tevapharm.comlnews/teva nnounces_
completion of novopharm.acquisition_04_00.aspx [https://perma.cc/MD6G-UXTQ]. In fact,
the only "discrimination" claim that Lilly raised was that the promise utility doctrine
impermissibly discriminated against a particular field of technology (pharmaceuticals), in
arguable violation of certain NAFTA IP provisions. See Gold, supra.
157. See Eli Lilly, Final Award, supra note 6, TT 312-16; Jeremy Sugarman, The Body
Hunters: Testing New Drugs on the World's Poorest Patients, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 425, 425
(2006), https://www.nejm.org/doilfull/10.1056/NEJMbkrev57619 [https://perma.cc/3AYX-
M6F5]. This is especially so as to the impact of IP protection on access to and affordability of
pharmaceuticals in the developing world. See Cynthia M. Ho, Global Access to Medicine: The
Influence of Competing Patent Perspectives, 35 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 3 (2016). For an
overview of the access to medicine debate, see id.
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states from weakening IP protections "dramatically." Domestic
interests (and foreign investors) can often be counted upon to vigorously
lobby governments to maintain strong standards,158 and governments
will often be receptive to those arguments, especially where those who
are disadvantaged by strong standards (e.g., consumers of IP) are
dispersed and politically weak, as they typically are.159 And states have
an ongoing incentive to compete for foreign capital by providing foreign
investors with the kinds of IP protections that foreign investors are
generally able to demand. Moreover, state-to-state dispute settlement,
as through the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding or analogous
procedures in free trade agreements, is readily available for serious
departures from those global minimum IP standards within which
states otherwise should enjoy wide regulatory latitude.160
This Article closes by briefly suggesting three possibilities.
First, states could specify in their investment treaties that IP-related
158. See Layna Mosley, Private Governance for the Public Good? Exploring Private
Sector Participation in Global Financial Regulation, in POWER, INTERDEPENDENCE, AND
NONSTATE ACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS 126, 134-35 (Helen V. Milner & Andrew Moravesik
eds., Princeton Univ. Press 2009). For example, Canada enjoys a robust domestic
pharmaceutical industry that can be expected to lobby the government on IP issues. See
Pharmacare Watchdog: 'Industry Influence Corrupts the Public Policy Process,' CBC NEWS
(June 18, 2015, 1:32 PM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/canadalbritish-columbialpharmacare-
watchdog-industry-influence-corrupts-the-public-policy-process- 1.3118914
[https://perma.cc/3XJT-CH8R]; Pharmaceutical Industry Profile, GOv'T CAN.,
https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/lsg-pdsv.nsf/eng/hhnOl7O3.html [https://perma.cc/Q94A-33RU]
(last visited Oct. 16, 2018). The Canadian government views that industry and its interests
as highly important to the Canadian economy, as evidenced by the extensive "industry
profile" provided on the government's economic development website. See Pharmaceutical
Industry Profile, supra. Eli Lilly also regularly lobbies Canadian government officials. See
Eli Lilly Canada Inc. /Lisa Matar, President and General Manager, OFF. COMMISSIONER
LOBBYING CAN., https://lobbycanada.gc.calapp/secure/ocl/lrs/do/clntSmmry?clientOrgCorpN
umber=6034&sMdKy=1538356990234 [https://perma.cc/NPV2-N52V] (last visited Oct. 16,
2018). As of writing, Canada's Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada reports
sixteen contacts between Eli Lilly lobbyists and officials in the past twelve months. See id.
159. See Jonathan D. Aronson, Intellectual Property Rights in a Networked World, in
POWER, INTERDEPENDENCE, AND NONSTATE ACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS 185, 188-89 (Helen
v. Milner & Andrew Moravcsik eds., 2009). On the relevance of consumer dispersion to IP
law, see Jonathan Reich, The Class Defense: Why Dispersed Intellectual Property Defendants
Need Procedural Protections, 9 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, TT 3-9 (2010).
160. See Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis-e/tif-e/agrm7_e.htm [https://perma.cc/Z648-
WASZ] (last visited Oct. 16, 2018). And even though states, not private actors, have access
to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, Philip Morris has shown that it is possible for
companies to pay WTO members for bringing IP-related WTO claims on their behalf. See
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 1, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869
U.N.T.S. 401; Puig, supra note 133, at 384. This is precisely what Philip Morris appears to
have done in the WTO corollary to its investment treaty lawsuit against Australia. See Puig,
supra note 133, at 384.
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policy actions that comply with TRIPS or with relevant IP chapters in
free trade agreements do not amount to a violation of FET. Such a move
would merely extend existing NAFTA practice as applied to IP-related
expropriation while also reflecting the reality that FET has become the
most problematic cause of action under modern investment treaties.161
Second, states could specify that investment tribunals do not
have jurisdiction to independently declare state actions as non-
compliant with international IP rules. Instead, a finding by a WTO or
FTA panel of noncompliance could be a prerequisite-ssentially on
ripeness grounds-to the investment tribunal's consideration of
whether the violation of international IP rules also amounts to a
violation of international investment law. This reform would address
the problem of inexpert and potentially conflicting international
decisions declaring particular conduct to violate international IP law.
Third, states could consider limiting remedies for IP-related
investment treaty violations to the investor's sunk costs. Limiting
damages to sunk costs may do a better job of aligning the business and
regulatory risks the IP investor has actually taken with the state's
liability for damages in the event of an investment treaty violation.
In the end, then, the Eli Lilly case suggests the potential for the
IIL system, in its current form, to interfere with the realization of a neo-
federalist vision of global IP law. While Eli Lilly lost on the merits (and
wasted significant resources in doing so), it is quite likely that the
company, or its pharmaceutical brethren, will file similar challenges as
to other drugs and other changes in domestic IP laws. In the
meantime-and especially in the context of the ongoing renegotiation
of NAFTA-states like Canada should seriously consider whether they
might attempt to limit the ability of foreign IP rights holders to
challenge domestic IP policy through the investor-state dispute
settlement mechanisms of IIL.
161. See supra Part III; supra Section IV.B.
[Vol. 21:2:517548
The Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law is published four times per
year by the Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law, Vanderbilt Law School,
Nashville, TN 37203-1181. "Second Class" postage is paid at Nashville, Tennessee, and at an
additional mailing office. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Vanderbilt Journal of
Entertainment & Technology Law, Vanderbilt Law School, 131 21st Avenue South, Nashville, TN
37203-1181.
Website and Blog: http/www.jetlaw.org
Subscriptions: Subscriptions are $35.00 per volume (domestic) and $40.00 per volume
(foreign). Subscriptions commence with the Fall issue of each volume. All subscriptions are
continued for each succeeding volume unless subscribers provide timely notice of cancellation.
Address changes must be made at least six weeks before publication date. The Journal honors
claims one year after the shipping date.
Inquiries and Information: Direct all address changes and requests for subscription
information and back issues to Faye Johnson, Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology
Law, Vanderbilt Law School, 131 21st Avenue South, Nashville, TN 37203-1181. The price for
back issues is $20.00 per issue, not including shipping and handling. Please email Faye Johnson at
faye.johnson@vanderbilt.edu. Back issues are also available in PDF format at
http://www.jetlaw.org.
Manuscripts: The Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law accepts
submission through ExpressO, Scholastica, emails sent to jetl@vanderbilt.edu (attach as a Word
document), and postal mail. All submissions or inquiries regarding the submission of an article
should be sent to the attention of the Senior Articles Editor. Electronic submission is preferred;
however, if you must send by postal mail, please direct all mail to Senior Articles Editor,
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law, Vanderbilt Law School, 131 21st Avenue
South, Nashville, TN 37203-1181.
Antidiscrimination Policy: It is the policy of the Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment
& Technology Law not to discriminate on the basis of race, gender, age, religion, ethnic
background, marital status, or sexual orientation.
The Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law supports robust and open
academic discussions of all topics in the areas of intellectual property and technology. However,
the viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily represent the views of Vanderbilt
University Law School or its faculty, authors, and staff.
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law
(ISSN 1536-3872)
0 2019 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law, Vanderbilt Law School
VANDERBILT LAW SCHOOL
OFFICERS OF THE UNIVERSITY
Nicholas Zeppos, Chancellor of the University; Professor of Law
Susan Wente, Provost and Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs
Audrey Anderson, Vice Chancellor, General Counsel and Secretary of the University
Jeffrey Balser, Vice Chancellor for Health Affairs and Dean of the School of Medicine
Steve Ertel, Vice Chancellor for Communications
Nathan Green, Vice Chancellor for Public Affairs
Anders Hall, Vice Chancellor for Investments and Chief Investment Officer
Eric Kopstain, Vice Chancellor for Administration
John M. Lutz, Vice Chancellor for Information Technology
Tina L. Smith, Interim Vice Chancellor for Equity, Diversity and Inclusion and Interim
Chief Diversity Officer
Susie Stalcup, Vice Chancellor for Development and Alumni Relations
Brett Sweet, Vice Chancellor for Finance and Chief Financial Officer
David Williams II, Vice Chancellor for University Affairs and Athletics; Athletics
Director; Professor of Law
LAw SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS
Chris Guthrie, Dean; John Wade-Kent Syverud Professor of Law
Susan Kay, Associate Dean for Clinical Affairs; Clinical Professor of Law
Spring Miller, Assistant Dean for Public Interest; Lecturer in Law
Larry Reeves, Associate Dean; Director, Alyne Queener Massey Law Library; Associate
Professor of Law
Christopher Serkin, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs; Professor of Law
FACULTY
Brooke Ackerly, Associate Professor of Political Science; Associate Professor of Philosophy;
Associate Professor of Law; Affiliated Faculty, Women's and Gender Studies; Principal
Investigator, Global Feminisms Collaborative
Phillip Ackerman-Lieberman, Associate Professor of Jewish Studies; Associate Professor of
Religious Studies; Affiliated Associate Professor of Islamic and History; Associate Professor
of Law
Rebecca Allensworth, Professor of Law
Robert Barsky, Professor of French, English and Jewish Studies; Professor of Law
Lauren Benton, Dean, Vanderbilt University College of Arts and Science; Nelson 0. Tyrone, Jr.
Chair in History; Professor of Law
Margaret Blair, Milton R. Underwood Chair in Free Enterprise; Professor of Law
Frank Bloch, Professor of Law Emeritus
James Blumstein, University Professor of Constitutional Law and Health Law & Policy;
Professor of Management, Owen Graduate School of Management; Director, Vanderbilt
Health Policy Center
C. Dent Bostick, Professor of Law Emeritus; Dean Emeritus
Lisa Bressman, David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair in Law; Professor of Law
Michael Bressman, Professor of the Practice of Law
Gary Brown, Professor of the Practice of Law; Partner, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough
Jon Bruce, Professor of Law Emeritus
Ari Bryen, Assistant Professor of Classical and Mediterranean Studies; Assistant Professor of
History; Assistant Professor of Law
Christopher (Kitt) Carpenter, Professor of Economics; Professor of Law; Professor of Health
Policy; Professor of Leadership Policy and Organizations
Edward Cheng, Hess Chair in Law; Professor of Law
William Christie, Frances Hampton Currey Professor of Management in Finance; Professor of
Law
Jessica Clarke, Professor of Law
Ellen Clayton, Craig-Weaver Chair in Pediatrics; Professor of Pediatrics; Professor of Health
Policy; Professor of Law
Mark Cohen, Justin Potter Professor of American Competitive Enterprise; Professor of
Management; Professor of Law; University Fellow, Resources for the Future
Robert Covington, Professor of Law Emeritus
Andrew Daughety, Gertrude Conaway Vanderbilt Professor of Economics; Professor of
Economics; Professor of Law
Colin Dayan, Robert Penn Warren Professor in the Humanities; Professor of American Studies;
Professor of Law
Paul Edelman, Professor of Mathematics; Professor of Law
Joseph Fishman, Associate Professor of Law
James Ely, Jr., Milton R. Underwood Professor of Law Emeritus; Professor of History Emeritus;
Lecturer in Law
Brian Fitzpatrick, Professor of Law
Tracey George, Associate Provost for Faculty Affairs; Charles B. Cox HI and Lucy D. Cox Family
Chair in Law & Liberty; Professor of Political Science; Director, Cecil D. Branstetter
Litigation and Dispute Resolution Program
Daniel Gervais, Milton R. Underwood Chair in Law; Professor of Law; Professor of French;
Director, Vanderbilt Intellectual Property Program; Director, LL.M. Program
Leor Halevi, Associate Professor of History; Associate Professor of Law
G.S. Hans, Assistant Clinical Professor of Law
Joni Hersch, Cornelius Vanderbilt Chair; Professor of Law and Economics; Co-Director, Ph.D.
Program in Law and Economics
Alex Hurder, Clinical Professor of Law Emeritus
Sarah Igo, Associate History; Associate Professor of Law
Owen Jones, New York Alumni Chancellor's Chair in Law; Professor of Law; Professor of
Biological Sciences; Director, MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and
Neuroscience
Allaire Karzon, Professor of Law Emerita
Nancy King, Lee S. and Charles A Speir Chair in Law; Professor of Law
Craig Lewis, Madison S. Wigginton Professor of Finance; Professor of Law
David Lewis, Chair, Political Science; William R. Kenan, Jr. Professor of Political Science;
Professor of Law
Harold Maier 1937-2014, David Daniels Professor of Law Emeritus
Terry Maroney, Professor of Law; Professor of Medicine, Health, and Society; Chancellor Faculty
Fellow; Co-Director, George Barrett Social Justice Program
John Marshall, Associate Professor of Law Emeritus
Larry May, W. Alton Chair of Philosophy; Professor of Law
Sara Mayeux, Assistant Professor; Assistant Professor of Law
Holly McCammon, Professor of Human and Organization Development; Professor of Law;
Professor of Sociology
Thomas McCoy, Professor of Law Emeritus
Thomas McGinn, Professor of History; Professor of Law
Karla McKanders; Clinical Professor of Law
Timothy Meyer, Professor of Law
Robert Mikos, Professor of Law
Beverly Moran, Professor of Law; Professor of Sociology
Michael Newton, Professor of the Practice of Law; Professor of the Practice of Political Science;
Director, Vanderbilt-in-Venice Program
Robert Reder, Professor of the Practice of Law; Partner, Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy
(Retired)
Jennifer Reinganum, E. Bronson Ingram Professor of Economics; Professor of Law
Morgan Ricks, Professor of Law
Lauren Rogal, Assistant Clinical Professor
Amanda Rose, Professor of Law; Professor of Management, Owen Graduate School of Business
Barbara Rose, Instructor in Law
James Rossi, Associate Dean for Research; Professor of Law; Judge D. L. Lansden Chair in Law
Edward Rubin, University Professor of Law and Political Science
John B. Ruhl, David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair in Law; Professor of Law; Director,
Program in Law and Innovation; Co-Director, Energy, Environment, and Land Use
Program
Herwig Schlunk, Professor of Law
Jeffrey Schoenblum, Centennial Professor of Law
Sean Seymore, Professor of Law; Professor of Chemistry
Daniel Sharfstein, Tarkington Chair of Teaching Excellence; Professor of Law; Professor of
History; Chancellor Faculty Fellow; Co-Director, George Barrett Social Justice Program
Matthew Shaw, Assistant Professor of Education; Assistant Professor of Law
Suzanna Sherry, Herman 0. Loewenstein Chair in Law
Jennifer Shinall, Associate Professor of Law
Ganesh Sitaraman, Chancellor Faculty Fellow; Professor of Law; Director, Program in Law and
Government
Paige Skiba, Professor of Law
Christopher Slobogin, Milton R. Underwood Chair in Law; Professor of Law; Director, Criminal
Justice Program; Affiliate Professor of Psychiatry
Kevin Stack, Lee S. and Charles A Speir Chair in Law; Professor of Law; Director of
Graduate Studies, Ph.D. Prqgram in Law and Economics
Jennifer Swezey, Assistant Professor of Law; Director, Legal Research and Writing Program
Randall Thomas, John S. Beasley H Chair in Law and Business; Director, Law and Business
Program; Professor of Management, Owen Graduate School of Management
R. Lawrence Van Horn, Associate Professor of Management (Economics); Associate Professor of
Law; Executive Director of Health Affairs
Michael Vandenbergh, David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair n Law; Professor of Law;
Director, Climate Change Research Network; Co-Director, Energy, Environment, and Land
Use Program
W. Kip Viscusi, University Distinguished Professor of Law, Economics, and Management;
Professor of Management; Professor of Economics; Co-Director, Ph.D. Program in Law and
Economics
Kimberly Welch, Assistant Professor of History; Assistant Professor of Law
Alan Wiseman, Professor of Political Science; Professor of Law
Ingrid Wuerth, Helen Strong Curry Chair in International Law; Professor of Law; Director,
International Legal Studies Program
Yesha Yadav, Professor of Law; Enterprise Scholar for 2017-19; Faculty Co-Director, LL.M.
Program
Claire Abely, Instructor in Law
Lawrence Ahern m, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Brown & Ahern
Arshad Ahmed, Adjunct Professor of Law; Co-Founder, Elixir Capital Management
Richard Aldrich Jr., Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Shadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom
(Retired)
Roger Alsup, Instructor in Law
Paul Ambrosius, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Trauger & Tuke
Rachel Andersen-Watts, Instructor in Law
Christopher Bellamy, Adjunct Professor of Law; Associate, Neal & Harwell
Linda Breggin, Adjunct Professor of Law; Senior Attorney, Environmental Law Institute
Larry Bridgesmith, Adjunct Professor of Law; Coordinator Program on Law & Innovation;
Inaugural Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management, Lipscomb University
Kenneth Byrd, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein
Judge Sheila Calloway, Adjunct Professor of Law; Juvenile Court Magistrate, Metropolitan
Nashville
Meredith Capps, Foreign and International Law Librarian; Lecturer in Law
Mark Chalos, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein
William Chandler, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati
Jenny Cheng, Lecturer in Law
William Cohen, Adjunct Professor of Law
Christopher Coleman, Adjunct Professor of Law
Roger Conner, Adjunct Professor of Law; Special Consultant on Public Service Career
Development
Matthew Curley, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Bass Berry & Sims
S. Carran Daughtrey, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant U.S. Attorney, Middle Tennessee
District
Paul, Deemer, Adjunct Professor of Law; Of Counsel, Vinson & Elkins, London (Retired Partner)
Diane Di lanni, Adjunct Professor of Law
Sarah Dunaway, Research Services Librarian; Lecturer in Law
Jason Epstein, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Nelson Mullins
Anne-Marie Farmer, Adjunct Professor of Law
Susan Foxman, Adjunct Professor of Law
Glenn Funk, Adjunct Professor of Law; District Attorney General, 20( Judicial District of
Tennessee
Jason Gichner, Adjunct Professor of Law; Attorney, Morgan & Morgan
Vice Chancellor Sam Glassock, Adjunct Professor of Law; Vice Chancellor, Delaware Court of
Chancery
Katie Hanschke, Head of Access Services, Law Library; Lecturer in Law
Aubrey (Trey) Harwell III, Adjunct Professor of Law
Kristen Hildebrand, Instructor in Law
Darwin Hindman m, Adjunct Professor of Law; Shareholder, Baker Donelson
The Honorable Randy Holland, Adjunct Professor of Law; Senior of Counsel, Wilson Sonsini
Goodrich & Rosati
Abrar Hussain, Adjunct Professor of Law; Co-founder and Managing Director, Elixir Capital
Management
Lynne Ingram, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant U.S. Attorney, Middle District of Tennessee
Martesha Johnson, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant Public Defender, Metropolitan Nashville
Public Defender's Office, 201h Judicial District
The Honorable Kent Jordan, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant Public Defender, Metropolitan
Nashville Public Defender's Office, 20"' Judicial District
Andrew Kaufman, Adjunct Professor of Law
Suzanne Kessler, Adjunct Professor of Law; Of Counsel, Bone McAllester Norton
Kevin Klein, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Klein Bussell
Russell Korobkin, Visiting Professor of Law; Richard C. Maxwell Professor of Law, UCLA Law
School
Kelly Leventis, Instructor in Law
William Martin, Adjunct Professor of Law, General Counsel, FirstBank; Retired Board Chair,
Stewardship Council
Cheryl Mason, Adjunct Professor of Law; Vice President, Litigation HCA
Richard McGee, Adjunct Professor of Law
James McNamara, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant Public Defender, Metro Nashville Public
Defender's Office
Robert McNeal, Adjunct Professor of Law; Shareholder, Liskow & Lewis
Caitlin Moon, Director of Innovation Design, Program in Law and Innovation; Adjunct Professor
of Law
Kelly Murray, Instructor in Law
Francisco Mfissnich, Adjunct Professor of Law; Senior Partner, Barbosa Mussnich & Aragao
Advogados
Sara Beth Myers, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant Attorney General, State of Tennessee
William Norton, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings
R. Gregory Parker, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Bass Berry & Sims
C. Mark Pickrell, Adjunct Professor of Law; Owner Pickrell Law Group
Steven Riley, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Riley Warnock & Jacobson
Brian Roark, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Bass Berry & Sims
Barbara Rose, Instructor in Law
Edmund Sauer, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings
Deborah Schander, Associate Director of Alyne Queener Massey Law Library; Lecturer in Law
Mark Schein, Adjunct Professor of Law; Chief Compliance Officer, York Capital Management
Matthew Schneller, Instructor in Law
Paul Schnell, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom
Teresa Sebastian, Adjunct Professor of Law
Arjun Sethi, Adjunct Professor of Law
Dumaka Shabazz, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public
Defender's Office
Justin Shuler, Adjunct Professor of Law; Legal Counsel, VEREIT, Inc.
Joseph Slights, Vice Chancellor, Delaware Court of Chancery; Adjunct Professor of Law
Saul Solomon, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Klein & Bussell
John Spagens, Adjunct Professor of Law; Associate, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein
Willy Stern, Adjunct Professor of Law
Tatiana Stoljarova, Adjunct Professor of Law; Senior Legal Counsel, Bridgestone Americas Inc.
Cara Suvall, Assistant Clinical Professor of Law
Wendy Tucker, Adjunct Professor of Law; Attorney, McGee Lyons and Ballinger; Member,
Tennessee Board of Education
Timothy Warnock, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Riley Warnock & Jacobson
Robert Watson, Adjunct Professor of Law; Senior Vice President & Chief Legal Officer,
Metropolitan Nashville Airport Authority
Susan Watson, Adjunct Visiting Professor of Law; Professor of Law and Deputy Dean, University
of Auckland Law School
Mark Williams, Head of Digital Initiatives, Law Library; Lecturer in Law
Thomas Wiseman Il, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Wiseman Ashworth Law Group
Luther Wright, Adjunct Professor of Law; Of Counsel, Ogletree Deakins


































































MATIHEW A. HORTON II
CAROLINE P. HYDE
MICHAEL A. KUSHNER
BOKANG LIU
REBECCA E. LUND
JOSHUA A. MANNING
CmusTIAN E. MARTIN
RACHEL A. MIKIASZEwSI
SARA J. ANDERSON
Notes Editor
JONATHAN M. GERKEN
Notes Editor
JAMES CHRISTOPHER GRACEY
Notes Editor
JOSHUA J. SCHOCH
Notes Editor
NICOLETTE A. SULLIvAN
Notes Editor
CASEY FOOTE
Publication Editor
GRETA E. MESSER
Publication Editor
SPENCER C. BROOKS
Development Editor
JOSHUA A. MYERS
GRANT A. NEWTON
LUCAS PAEZ
ERIK RICHARD PETERSON
NATHANIEL A. PLEMONS
ALEXANDRA M. PRATI
SARAH JULIA RODRIGUE
JACKSON CRAIG SMITH
COURTNEY A. TIBBETTS
BAILEY R. VINCENT
JIN YOSHIKAWA
DAN1EL GERvAis
Faculty Advisor
FAYE JOHNSON
Program Coordinator

